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These four papers together offer a fairly rare
satisfaction, at least in the social sciences: First,
they deal with the same general problem, the
relationship between agentic beliefs and achieve-
ment, mostly educational or occupational. Second,
the data are from different samples in different
societies undergoing different kinds of sociopoli-
tical and economic change and they are are
analysed by a variety of methods. Finally,
mirabile dictu, their findings agree on the general
nature of the relationship between agency and
achievement, namely, it is to a considerable degree
reciprocal—agentic beliefs influence achievement,
and achievement, especially success, influences
agentic beliefs. In addition to demonstrating
the generality of this effect, they present other
findings that suggest basic similarities between
rather different social systems. For instance,
Schoon (2007, this issue) shows that a child’s
education in the UK is largely determined by his/
her parents’ education. Despite 50 years of
socialism, with its special laws making it easy for
working-class children to enter university, this is
just as true in Poland. To illustrate, Cichomski
(2004) found that among citizens of Warsaw who
only completed primary school, nearly half had
fathers who also had no more than a primary
school education, whereas less than 10% had
fathers who were university graduates. Similarly,
Diewald (2007, this issue) finds that agentic
Germans see their successes as dispositional (due
to personal effort and skill), and failures as
situational (due to circumstances beyond anyone’s
control), an effect that is observed in many
different societies and that follows directly from
attribution theory.
Equally interesting are the cross-national differ-
ences. For example, Evans (2007, this issue)
demonstrated that the level of educational and
occupational success varies from one country to
another depending on the range of different kinds
of education and jobs the social system makes
available to members; Schoon (2007, this issue)
observed comparable differences in predictors of
success as a function of the cohort. Taken
together, these findings imply that in societies
undergoing social change, cohort differences in
achievement are likely because the range of
opportunities afforded to individuals early in the
process of change is different from that afforded
later on. For instance, the best predictor of adult
social status for disadvantaged individuals born in
1958 was their teenage educational aspirations;
however, for disadvantaged youths born in 1970
the best predictor of adult social status was exam
performance. This suggests that the former cohort
had better opportunities; that is, a larger number
of career options were available to these indivi-
duals, and thus, success depended less on the
demonstration of academic competence than it did
in the latter cohort. Under these conditions,
processes mediating between individual agentic
beliefs and educational or occupational outcomes
may be critical in explaining cohort differences in
the agency–achievement relationship. In Poland,
for instance, the number of different kinds of
schooling or careers available to individuals
entering the labour market prior to the transition
to a market economy was relatively small com-
pared to the range available to those entering the
labour market several years later after the transi-
tion. With this in mind we attempted to predict
successful adaptation to the transition taking into
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account (1) changes in the options available to
individuals in a variety of domains, not only
education and careers but also consumer goods,
vacation packages, and the like; and (2) individual
differences in decision style, that is, the person’s
characteristic way of deciding which of the
available options in a particular domain are
acceptable or worth pursuing. Our analysis then
examined the effect of the interaction of these two
factors on how satisfied the person was with his/
her standard of living, financial situation, etc. now
compared to that under socialism. Two polar
opposite decision styles were considered: (1)
Interval strategists are individuals who aren’t
choosy; they are characteristically willing to settle
for any one of a large number of options (types of
education, jobs, consumer goods, vacation
packages, etc.) as ‘‘good enough’’. (2) In contrast,
point strategists are choosy; they characteristically
accept only a narrow range of options, often
rejecting all but one (Wieczorkowska & Burnstein,
1999, 2000, 2002; Wieczorkowska-Nejtardt, 1998).
The theory of agency outlined in the four papers
suggests that an interval strategy is likely to be
associated with weak agentic beliefs, and a point
strategy with strong agentic beliefs. If this is so,
then based on our research it follows that weak
agentic beliefs are more adaptive during those
stages of a transition in which options are scarce,
and strong agentic beliefs more adaptive when
options are plentiful, although the latter probably
holds primarily for those with sufficient financial,
educational, or other resources to take advantage
of the change. Thus, in a socialist economy, when
job hunting, deciding on an education, or purchas-
ing consumer goods, interval strategists avoid the
frustration and other costs of the prolonged, often
fruitless search that point strategists are bound to
incur. In a market economy, however, the point
strategists, because they are discriminating and
unwilling to consider more than one or a few
options as worth pursuing, avoid the interval
strategist’s fate, namely, settling for an inferior
kind of education, job, or product when some-
thing much better is available. Indeed, we
(Wieczorkowska & Burnstein, 2004a, b) find that
point compared to interval strategists do feel a
significantly greater increase in self-efficacy after
the transition to a market economy.
These papers also illustrate the difficulty of
constructing indices of the complex cognitive and
affective processes assumed by agency theory
using survey data, as well as the problems that
arise when these processes are ignored. For
example, in Titma, Tuma, and Roots’ (2007, this
issue) analysis the two psychological variables,
self-ratings of organizational skills and leadership
ability, produce skewed distributions and, as a
result, are useless as predictors. Agency is a
psychological state or a characteristic of the mind
with a number of antecedents and consequent
processes; conceptually, these are mediating opera-
tions having to do with self-assessments (‘‘Do I
have sufficient resources, skills, etc.?’’) and assess-
ments of the situation (‘‘What are the opportu-
nities, the barriers?’’), among other things, that
need to be taken into account when attempting to
predict individual actions and achievements, as
agency theory does. This may be especially
important during transitions when both self and
situations are in flux. The sociological variables
used in these papers are clearly too distal and gross
to explain agency effects. More importantly, by
leaving mediation processes unspecified, they are
not reliable (and, under some conditions, not even
valid) indices of agency.
We should note that Evans (2007, this issue)
does describe several interesting transition beha-
viours—forms of purposive styles that could be
candidates for mediating processes. She called
these styles (1) strategic, (2) step by step, (3) taking
chances, and (4) wait and see. However, it remains
unclear what specific style is associated with a
particular degree of agency, the extent to which the
styles are mutually exclusive or, if not, what
combinations are likely. For example, a step-by-
step strategist could be a person who is a careful
planner, who lays out each ‘‘step’’ in the achieve-
ment sequence and represents in his/her mind the
series of subgoals he or she has to achieve (the
‘‘steps’’ in step by step). In short, she or he takes
into account the situational contingencies likely to
arise and how to overcome them to arrive at a final
goal. But if this individual does have a final goal,
why isn’t he or she also categorized as ‘‘strategic’’?
Alternatively, the person does not establish his/her
own final goal but instead accepts as ‘‘good
enough’’ the traditional goal(s) society offers and
arrives at the latter via the traditional ‘‘steps.’’ Is
she or he a ‘‘strategic’’ type? Similarly, ‘‘take a
chance’’ may imply a risk-taker. But the risk
can be either reasonable, with an acceptable
probability of success given the person’s ability,
or unreasonable, a dream far beyond his/her
abilities. The reasonable risk-taker may plan
carefully (again, step by step); the dreamer
doesn’t, but simply ‘‘tosses the dice.’’ Are both
‘‘take a chance’’ types? Also, how does realism in
planning, by taking into account situational
contingencies—the unpredictable but not unlikely
events affecting goal achievement—enter into this
analysis?
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Agency beliefs often seem to be not much more
than a person’s overall feeling of optimism or
pessimism about goal achievement. Presumably it
influences how she or he decides which goals to
pursue, but how does it do this? To explain the
interaction between transition stages and agentic
beliefs you should know, first, how individuals
assess their abilities and motivation as well as the
situational affordances; and, second, how indivi-
duals decide on a particular decision strategy—
under what conditions are they flexible enough to
switch from one strategy to the other even though
it may not be the strategy they characteristically
prefer? This raises an additional conceptual issue
critical for agency theory: Are agency beliefs
domain-specific or domain-general? These, of
course, do not need to be mutually exclusive.
People can have a belief about their general or
overall (domain-general) agentic prowess that is
relatively independent of how they assess their
ability to control the outcome in a particular
domain. In any event, until such conceptual issues
are resolved, measuring agentic beliefs is proble-
matic and the explanatory value of the theory is
limited.
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